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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
DIVIDEND POLICY-AS AFFECTED BY DEPRECIATION
AND DEPLETION
-"The same elements of value for rate making may be accorded differ.
ent authority when considered for income tax purposes, or for the pur-
pose of determining the right of directors to pay dividends." I
T[HIS is perhaps nowhere more easily demonstrated than in the
case of depreciation and depletion. It is the purpose of this
note to consider the significance of depreciation and depletion for
the legality of corporate dividend declarations.
Depreciation is generally thought of as the loss of value through
wear and tear or decay of property.! For example, a machine de-
preciates in value by merely the passage of time. If it is in use, it
is worn out; if it is not in use, it decays or rusts or otherwise loses
value. Also, a machine that will do a certain job in ten hours may
be made obsolete by another machine that will do the job in one
hour." Thus the value may depreciate by reason of technical devel-
opments. All of these factors must be considered in arriving at a
method of depreciation. Usually engineers, taking all things into
consideration, estimate that a certain machine, building, etc., will
last for so many years;' thereupon, the cost of the machine will be
prorated over this period as a charge to depreciation expenses,
thus lessening the value of the property by a set amount each
year until it is entirely written off the books.
I Guaranty Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids, G. H. & M. Ry., 7 F. Supp. 511, 519 (W. D.
Mich. 1931), modified and af'd sub nom.; United Light & Power Co. v. Grand Rapids
Trust Co., 85 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. granted on petition of receiver, 299
U. S. 534 (1936), dism'd per stipulation of counsel, 299 U. S. 618 (1936) ; cert. denied
on petition of United Light & Power Co., 299 U. S. 591 (1936), (1937) 31 ILL. L REv."
670. This language is quoted with approval in Gallagher v. New York Dock Co., 19 N.
Y. S. (2d) 789, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
2 For other and more technically correct definitions see PATON, ACCOUNTANTS' HAND-
OOK (3rd ed. 1947) 711; HOACLAND, CORPORATION FINANCE (2d ed. 1938) 326.
3 For a discussion as to the propriety of having a separate "reserve" for obsolescence,
see PATON, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 730-34.
4 For other methods of arriving at rates see PATON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 765 et seq.
5 Cost is now, in general, the accepted base upon which to compute depreciation. See
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 606 (1944). This decision is a latent accept-
ance of the cost theory as ably advanced in a dissent by Justice Brandeis in United Rail.
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Depletion, on the other hand, is comparable to the consump-
tion of a stock of raw materials. A property, such as oil, gas,
mineral deposits, and sometimes timber stands,' is being taken
from its natural depository or stock pile and will eventually be
exhausted. This type of loss in value goes on only in direct pro-
portion to the working of the property. Of course, the difficulty
in connection with depletion is to determine just how much mate-
rial is in the stock pile. While any observer can perceive that the
supply is being used, it is hard to say with accuracy how much
is there in the first place. In the case of an oil well, one knows
that eventually the pool of oil will be exhausted, but it is very
hard to get an acurate measurement of how many barrels of oil
are in the pool. This method is called "real" depletion as opposed
to "percentage" depletion to be discussed later.'
The accounting method generally used for reflection of these
losses of value by depreciation and depletion is that of "reserve"
accounts. Such accounts are set up on the corporation's books by
having a debit item called "Depreciation (or Depletion) Expense."
This is offset by a credit item called "Reserve for Depreciation
(or Depletion)." At the end of the year an entry is made debiting
"Expense" and crediting the "Reserve" account with the proper
amount. Then the "Expense" account is charged against "profit
and loss" as is any other expense item such as wages, materials,
rent, etc. The "Reserve" is usually carried as a deduction from
ways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 255 (1929). For discussions of
the different bases upon which depreciation may be computed see Norman Fitzhugh,
Accounting or Depredation and Depletion (1939) 45 W. VA. L Q. 134, 137; PATON,
op. cit. supra note 2. at 712-19. The above method of apportioning the base (cost) is the
so-called "straight line" method. It, too, is the generally accepted one. See PATON, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 751 et seq.; also Note (1935) 33 MicH. L REY. 783 for discussions
of it and other methods of apportionment.
s For further discussion and other borderline illustrations see PAroN, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 617 et seq. Patents are sometimes included, but these exhaust by lapse of a
certain time and this is usually taken care of by "amortization."
T See note 50 infra.
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the property being depreciated or depleted so that the item appears
on tha balance sheet as follows:'
Buildings $100,000
Less: Reserve for Depreciation 10,000 $90,000.
It might be well to point out that this "Reserve" is not an actual
outlay of money as is popularly supposed.! Simply, it is the esti-
mate of the lessening in value of the building (or oil well) brought
about by the passage of time (or workings of the well). This is done
by accountants in an effort to show as truly as possible the present
worth of all the properties.1" These accounts are called "asset
valuation accounts." '"
As can be seen, these are real losses in value, and, an important
question of corporate finance is how much emphasis directors of
a corporation should put upon these factors in determining whether
or not dividends should be declared." At the outset it should be
stated that there is a dearth of judicial materials upon the prob-
lem for two reasons: in the first place, when dividends are not
declared, the law presumes that directors act in good faith and
with sound discretion; 3 and second, when dividends are declared
stockholders seldom seem to bother to question whether or not it
8 See NOBLE, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (3rd ed. 1945) or another basic accounting
book for further details.
9 On rare occasions actual money outlays as a so-called "sinking fund" are provided
for. See PATON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 624 for a discussion of depletion and at 757-58
for methods of provision for depreciation. See also Note (1938) 24 VA. L. Rev. 293 for
a discussion of sinking funds in general.
10 For an excellent recent work on depreciation considerations since the war, see the
pamphlet of the Brookings Institution by KrMMsL, DEPRECIATION POLICY AND POSTWAR
EXPANSION (1946). For a good overall discussion of depreciation problems see DEWPSC,
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1941) 554 et seq.
" See HOAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 327.
12 HOAcLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 328 says "to what extent depreciation and deple-
tion should be accounted for before dividends are declared legally is another unsettled
question."
ia Wabash Ry. v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197 (1929). Courts generally interfere only
where bad faith, fraud, or other breach of trust is shown. See City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 309 (1931).
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was a wise policy to declare them; rather they proceed on the
assumption that "a bird in hand is worth two in the bush."
It is also worth mentioning that both depreciation and deple-
tion expenses are allowable deductions from federal income
taxes." This factor more than any accounting theory has brought
these expenses to the forefront of good management policy. That
all allowable deductions will naturally be taken for income tax
purposes seems to afford a good argument for taking these deduc-
tions before declaring dividends.
DEPRECIATION
The Texas statutory provision governing the declaration of
dividends provides that
"They [the directors] shall ... declare and make such dividends of
the profits from the business of the corporation as they shall deem expe-
dient, or as the by-laws may prescribe." 1"
Most cases on the point of depreciation have taken for granted
that depreciation should be deducted before declaring dividends.
The Texas courts do not seem to have defined the statutory term
"profits" available for dividends." The term has been defined in
other connections as follows:
". profit .. is, generally speaking, what remains in the conduct
of a business after deducting from the total receipts all the expenses
14 52 STAT. 460 (19381, as amended by 56 STAT. 819 (1942), 26 U. S. C. § 23 (1)
(depreciation I and (m) (depletion) (1940). For bases for depreciation and depletion,
see 52 STAT. 494 (1938), 26 U. S. C. § 114 (1940). For an early case under the first cor-
poration tax statute (1909) measuring taxes by gross income which draws a good dis-
tinction between depreciation and depletion, see Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.,
242 U. S. 503. 524-26 (1916).
1 -Tr-x. Rex'. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon. 1925) art. 1329 (italics supplied). See also
TE.x. PEN. CODE ANN. (Vernon, 1947 Stipp.) art. 1083 (a), for penalties for declaring
dividends "out of any funds other than actual earnings."
16 See 2 HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATtONS (1942) § 472 where he says that Texas
courts have never actually decided whether this means surplus or merely net profits.
Roughly, surplus is the amount by which the value of assets exceeds the value of liabili-
ties plus capital stock. Net profits, as seen from the definition in the case infra note 17,
can exist without a surplus. It is not the purpose of this article to bring up this contro-
versy, but only generally to state that the better accounting principles demand that there
be a surplus before dividends can be declared.
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incurred in carrying on the business.... To such expenses may be
charged taxes, upkeep, depreciation, and interest .... " 17
A similar view as to the propriety of deducting depreciation
was taken in two early English cases"8 in which Jessel, M. R.,
declared:
". .. before you can ascertain the net profits, a sum of money ought
to be set aside as representing the amount in which the wear and tear
of the [railway] line has so far depreciated it in value as that that sum
will be required for the next year or next two years."' 1
One court has gone so far as to take judicial notice of deprecia-
tion and says that no corporation would be regarded as well con-
ducted which did not deduct for depreciation before dividends are
declared. 0
The most recent case on the point is Cannon v. Wiscassett Mills
Co., in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a
valuation of the profit for dividend purposes, as set by the lower
court, without considering a deduction for depreciation was
error.2
It can thus be seen that there is now almost unanimity of ju-
dicial opinion that depreciation should be provided for, consist-
ently with good accounting theory, before dividends can be de-
17 Dealers' Granite Corporation v. Faubion, 18 S. W. (2d) 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
The language is quoted approvingly, although not on the point of depreciation, in Stapper
v. Van Valkenburgh & Vogel, 128 S. W. (2d) 466, 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), writ of
error dism'd, judgment correct. Most of the language of this sort in the cases has been
taken from 2 CooK ON CORPORATIONS (6th ed. 1906) 1479.
's Dent v. London Tramways Co., 16 Ch. D. 344 (1879) and Davison v. Gillies, 16
Ch. D. 347, n. (1879).
19 Davison v. Gillies, 16 Ch. D. 347n, 348n (1879). See note 9 supra for references
on actual outlays of money. -
20 People ex rel. Jamaica Water Supply Co. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners,
190 N. Y. 39, 89 N. E. 587 (1909); accord, National Newark & Essex Banking Co. of
Newark v. Durant Motor Co. of New Jersey, 124 N. J. Eq. 213, 1 A. (2d) 316 (CL of Ch.
1938), af'd, 125 N. J. Eq. 435. 5 A. (2d) 767 (Er. & App. 1939),
21195 N. C. 119, 141 S. E. 344 (1928).
22 For a detailed and sensible discussion, see Guaranty Trust Co. x. Grand Rapids,
G. H. & M. Ry., 7 F. Supp. 511 (W. D. Mich. 1931) (see note I supra). For a Texas
decision not directly in point but which discusses depreciation, see Dealers' Granite
Corporation v. Faubion. 18 S. W. (2d) 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (see note 17 supra).
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clared. 5 Thus the courts have followed business practice in this
respect.'
DEPLETION
In the case of depletion, however, it may be seen from the two
leading cases on the point that the course of decision has not been
so fortunate. Supposedly standing for the doctrine that depletion
need not be considered before a declaration of dividends is the
famous English case of Lee v. Naucuwuel Asphalte Company,"'
which involved a mining company with articles of association pro.
viding (Art. 100) that the directors "shall not be bound to form
a fund, or otherwise reserve moneys, for the renewal or replac-
ing of any lease, or of the company's interest in any property or
concession."" (The articles of association did provide for depre-
ciation). Moreover, the articles provided for two kinds of stock,
comparable to modern preferred and common stock. The pre-
ferred stock, however, provided for preference only as to divi-
dends, with no preference provided for on dissolution. It was
also found as a fact by the trial court that the mines and proper-
ties had actually increased in value due to new discoveries on
the leases. With this situation, a preferred stockholder sued to
enjoin payment of a dividend to the common stockholders on the
ground that no depletion fund or reserve had been set up by the
directors. Plaintiff's counsel contended that the above provisions
of the articles were contrary to the law. It was almost a foregone
23 See Guaranty Trust Company v. Grand Rapids, G. H. & M. Ry., 7 F. Supp. 511
(W. D. Mich. 1931) (see note 1 supra) for a discussion of the then (1925) unsettled
state of accounting opinion upon the subject and for a holding that such a state of affairs
precluded a finding that the directors evidenced a lack of good faith in declaring divi-
dends. As evidenced by PATON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 711 et'seq. there is now accord
among accountants that depreciation should be considered.
24 Most corporation statutes are silent on the subject of depreciation and its relation
to dividends. A few of the more recently enacted ones (see note 43 in/ra) require that
it be deducted, but do not provide how the charges for it should be computed or what
factors should be considered. This would not seem to be unsatisfactory, however, since
these considerations are for the sound discretion of the directors.
2s41 CbL D. 1 (1-'39).
2a 1d. at 3.
1947]
TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
conclusion that the court should hold for the defendant, if for no
other reason than that this was a valid and binding contract on
both parties and that the plaintiff had consented that no such
reserve need be set up. This case, however, has since been cited
almost universally for the proposition that no depletion reserve
need be set up in companies that are organized to exploit a wast-
ing asset. 7
The other pertinent case, supposedly contra to the Lee case, is
Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co.,"5 in which there
was a fact situation similar to that of the Lee case. The plaintiff.
a preferred stockholder of the mining concern, sued to enjoin
payment of dividends to the common stockholders without first
providing for a depletion reserve. However, here the preferred
stockholders were also preferred on dissolution. There was also
no provision in the charter, as in the Lee case, that there should
be no depletion reserve. Moreover, there was no increase in value;
in fact, there was a substantial decrease since the properties had
been worked for a number of years. The court rightly held, con-
struing the then existing Delaware statute,"' that failure to pro-
vide for depletion amounted to declaring dividends out of capital
and granted the injtntction. This decision was affirmed on appeal."
27 See 2 llu-nEBRANn, T:xAs COnPORTIONS (1912) 473. In 1 DODD & BAKr., CsE.-
AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ASSoCIATIONS (1940) 1094, n. 3. the editors say: "although
the [Lee] case has been treated by American text-writers and by some American courts
as a statement of a general common law rule applicable to American as well as English
corporations, the case is subject to important comments the significance of which must
not be overlooked in dealing with the case in this country: ... [here the editors quoted
Article 100 of the company articles] ; and the case is closely related to an English doc-
trine, of very dubious validity in this country in the absence of statute, that losses, how-
ever catsed, in 'permanent' or 'fixed' capital assets as distinguished from what are
called 'circulating' or 'floating' assets need not be made good before dividends can be
declared, if there are current operating profits to cover the dividend." See Weiner.
Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law; The English Cases (1928) 28 COL. L. REV.
1046.
2s 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 AtI. 48 (1926).
29 D.. RFv. CoDE (1915) §§ 1948 and 1949. These two statutes were virtually the
same as the present Texas statutes, Tmx. REV. CI. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1329 and
Tax. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1947 sttpp.) art. 1083 (a) taken together. See note 15 supra.
30 15 Del Ch. 409, 138 A. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1927). 55 A. L. R. 1, note at 8 (1928). See
Note (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 79, Note (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. Rev. 350.
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Just one month after the appellate decision, however, the Dela-
ware legislature amended the statute"1 to read that depletion need
not be provided for; so that the plaintiff was defeated on the
retrial before the chancellor.12 The chancellor's opinion in the
first case had thoroughly analyzed most of the cases and indicated
that the Lee case was distinguishable on the facts.
One later English case 3 has distinguished the Lee case and put
the question on a wholly equitable basis, the judge saying that
"the real question for determination, therefore, is whether there
are profits available for distribution, and this is to be answered
according to the circumstances of each particular case, the nature
of the company, and the evidence of competent witnesses. There
is no single definition of the word 'profits' which will fit all
cases.""' He further says of the Lee case,
"... plaintiffs contend that the Lee case is an authority for this prop-
osition as a universal negative, namely, 'that no company owning wast-
ing property need ever create a depreciation [depletion] fund.' In my
opinion, that is not the true result of the decision. It must be remem-
bered that in that case there had been no loss of assets,... and the court
decided nothing more than the particular proposition that some com-
panies with wasting assets need have no depreciation [depletion]
fund."35
This would seem to be a proper interpretation of the Lee hold-
31 35 Del. Laws (1927), c. 85. § 16, which was substituted for § 1948, note 29 supra.
It reads as follows: "The directors•., shall have power to declare and pay dividends
upon the shares of its capital stock either out of its annual net profits or out of its net
assets in excess of its capital.... Subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate
of incorporation, the directors of any corporation engaged in the exploitaion of wasting
assets, without taking into consideration the depletion of such assets resulting from lapse
of time or from necessary consumption of such assets incidental to their exploitation
... " may declare dividends. Amortization of patents may be included as a result of the
provision that depletion of assets resulting from lapse of time need not be considered.
Notice also the two funds, net profits or surplus, out of which dividends may be declared.
This was apparently taken from the similar language in the New Jersey statute (N. J.
REv. STATS. (1937) § 14:8-19). See also note 16.supra.
•2 15 Del. Ch. 351, 138 At. 352 (1927).
'3 Bond v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co. [19021 1 Ch. D. 353.
3t1d. at 365.
a Ibid. It is interesting to note that neither the appelants nor the appellees in Wit.
tenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co. cited this case in their briefs. See the case
with the briefs in the report in 55 A. L R. 1, 2, 3 (1928).
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ing. However, the English cases have never overruled the Lee
case, and no other decision has been found even distinguishing it.
Only occasionally has an English court even cited the Lee case."8
The House of Lords expressly refused to comment on the proposi-
tion one way or the other in the only case remotely touching the
point that it has considered."7 The few American cases in point
have followed the Lee case without question," except of course
the Wittenberg case."9 This course of decision was aided by two
factors; (1) Morawetz in his work" laid down the proposition
before the Lee case was decided and in later editions cited the
case as authority; and (2) accounting principles were not at the
outset very definitely formulated, so that there was much differ-
ence of opinion even among expert witnesses.' The Uniform Busi-
ness Corporations Act'2 and the acts of a few states 3 besides Dela-
38 See annotations in 9 ENGLISH AND EMPIRE DIGEST (1940) case No. 1105, and sup-
plements of 1941 and 1945.
s7 E.g., Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A. C. 477.
38 Excelsior Water & Mining Co. v. Pierce, 90 Cal. 131, 27 Pac. 44 (1891) ; Mellon
v. Mississippi Wire Glass Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 498, 78 Atl. 10 (Ch. 1910) ; Goodnow v.
American Writing Paper Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 645, 66 Atil. 607 (Ch. 1907), all'd, 73 N. J. Eq.
692, 69 A. 1014 (Er. & App. 1908) ; Boothe v. Summit Coal Mining Co., 55 Wash. 167,
104 P. 207 (1909).
39 See notes 28, 30 and 32 supra. See also Pardee v. Harwood Electric Co., 262 Pa. 68,
105 At. 48 (1918). See also Petroleum Rights Corporation v. Midland Royalty Corpo-
ration ....... Del. Ch ... 167 Atil. 835 (Ch. 1933), in which the Delaware court after the
IWittenberg case and after the change in the statute held that depletion must be deducted
before a balance sheet surplus could exist. It was a somewhat strained fact situation and
the statute was not cited nor was any case.
40 1 MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1886) § 442.
41 See note 23 supra. See also pp. 12 and 13 for the quotation from the Bond case in
which the court used the term "depreciation" where the obviously correct word was
"depletion.'' This would suggest that the word was not in common use at the time of the
decision in 1902, if at all.
42 MoDE. BusiNFss CORPoaRTIONS ACT § 24 (VII), which is very similar to the Dela-
ware statute cited in note 31 supra.
43 See IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 22-129 and LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 1106,
which adopted the Model Act. See also OHto CODE ANN. (Baldwin, 1938) § 8623-38,
which was a forerunner and partial inspiration for the Model Act. See also CAL. Cwy.
CODE (Deering, 1941) § 346; GA. CODE ANN. (1936) § 22-1835, enacted Ga. Laws 1937-
1938, p. 229, § 16; INn. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 25-221; Kans. Laws, 1939, c. 152,
§ 82: MtcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) § 21.22; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1938 supp.)
§ 7492-21; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) § 2852.701; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
.1932) 1 3803-24; and W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1943) § 3082. See also KEHL, CoRpo-
RTE DVrDENDS (1941) 128-29. See also 1 DODD & BAKER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1102-05
(Vol. 1
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ware" have expressly dealt with the problem. It is submitted, how-
ever, that equity and more settled accounting principles will take
care of the problem and that these statutory pronouncements will
prove to be too dogmatic.""
Only one Texas case" has been found even remotely touching
the point, and that was in connection with the construction of the
meaning of the term "net profits" in a corporation note. One of
the incorporators sold some land on which a quarry was located
to the corporation. In return therefor, he took a note from the
corporation reciting that he would be paid out of "net profits."
The court held that depletion (the opinion said amortization)
should not be deducted before a payment on the note. Actually,
even without considering depletion, there was no profit from
which money could be paid on the note. The decision is not di-
rectly in point on the problem under discussion, but it is the only
decision in the state giving a definition of net profits and also the
only one even remotely touching the wasting asset doctrine. There
is also some support of the decision from accountants."'
From these cases then, there has evolved the so called "wasting
asset doctrine" which is to the effect that a corporation that is
for a discussion of the effect of the statutes. For further criticisms and discussion see
Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes and Cases (1929)
29 COL. L. REv. 460,481-82.
44 See note 31 supra.
4 sE.g., under the Indiana statute (note 43 supra) the wasting asset exemption states
that it is subject both to the rights of stockholders of different classes and also to the
rights of creditors. This, in effect, renders the proviso meaningless. See also 2 HELD&
BRAND, TEXAs COrtPORATIONS (1942) § 473.
48 Dealers' Granite Corporation v. Fatibion, 18 S. W. (2d) 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
no writ of error.
47 See pamphlet by Joseph McElroy, C. P. A., DEPLETION OF OIL AND GAS PROPER-
Tis (1923) 34, for the observation that "as long as the income from a (oil or gas) prop-
erty exceeds the lifting costs it is profitable to operate that property, despite any deple-
tion or depreciation charges.... Accountants' statements must be practical, and correct
technical treatment may be discarded or modified if it is liable to lead to errors of
policy. For these reasons, it is suggested that in presenting operating statements, the
operating profit for each property should be first ascertained before considering deple-
tion charges." However, it should be pointed out that Mr. McElroy was talking about
an individual proprietorship in the above article and not a corporation. This may or
may not be his view as to a corporation.
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exploiting a wasting asset need not provide for depletion before
declaring dividends. Not only does this permit a declaration of
dividends out of capital, but also some decisions" and text
writers" say that it leaves a corporation free to declare dividends
out of net profits when there is no surplus due to 'reasons other
than depletion. This seems an absurd extension of a doctrine that
lets wasting asset companies get around the law by permitting
them to impair capital by dividend payments without paying the
consequences. Anyone getting depletion gets a great tax advantage
in any event'" without their being given a double advantage by
declaring dividends out of capital. The only exception to the doc-
trine thus far engrafted is where a company is in the business
of exhausting many properties and in a continuing business of it
and contemplating the exploitation of more than one lease. Such
companies must then take depletion on the theory that the deple-
tion works like depreciation to provide a fund or reserve for new
equipment. It is argued that creditors are protected in these in-
stances even though no depletion is taken. However, it is submitted
that the capital stock figure of any corporation is the figure that
creditors look to for protection; and it would seem that creditors
of a wasting asset company are entitled to the same protection as
those of any other company, even though it may be far greater
than the actual debts of the company.
With reference to depletion, then, in a corporation where there
are preferred stockholders-preferred as to dividends and dis-
solution-and common stockholders, it would seem that depletion
should be deducted before dividends are declared. The capital
should be kept intact so that on dissolution there will be some-
4s See Bailey v. Guaranty Liquidating Corporation, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 401,60 P. (2d)
579 (1936).
49 BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS Irev. ed. 1946) § 251: 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPMIA
OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed.) § 5347.
5o See statutes cited note 14 supra which provide for an option in the taking of deple-
tion either by the "real" method or by the "percentage" method whichever is higher.
The "percentage" method allows the corporation to deduct 27 / per cent of the gross
income from the wasting property each year. This is allowed even though the entire cost
of the property may be recovered many times by depletion.
(Vol. I
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thing to divide among the preferred stockholders. This is also a
good device for the protection of creditors, particularly the long-
term ones. However, in a close corporation, or in one where there
is only common stock, as far as dividends are concerned it would
seem that the decision should be up to the stockholders as to
whether they want to save anything for dissolution or to take all
the profits and capital out of the corporation in the form of divi-
dends (assuming they are not violating any state statute).
CONCLUSION
It would seem that depreciation should be considered as a real
expense and should always be deducted before dividends are de-
clared.' It also would seem that the Lee case should be carefully
limited to the facts on which it was decided; the view that it
amounts to an unequivocal declaration that depletion need not be
considered should be forgotten altogether." Preferred stockhold-
ers and bondholders and long-term creditors should make certain
that the charter, or at least the by-laws, contain a provision ex-
pressly providing for depreciation and depletion reserves. By
such an express provision, almost certain conflict could easily
be avoided.
Robert G. Storey, Jr.
51 The late Dean Hildebrand in 2 TEXAS CORPORATIONS (1942) 311 says that "when
our judges become better acquainted with the rules of accounting, their statements con-
cerning the declaration of dividends will be more accurate." This is perhaps a bit dog-
matic. It would seem that as accounting practices become more standardized and more
nearly approach a science, it will follow that the judges' opinions will become more con-
formative. But, the judge must take the word of experts in fields where he has only a
general knowledge and when the experts differ, so do the judges.
52 For annotations on the general topic of considerations before declaring dividends
see Notes 55 A. L R. 8 (1928), 76 A. L. R. 885 (1932), and 109 A. L R. 1381 (1937).
As Professor Ralph J. Baker of Harvard has observed, "if one has a preference on assets,
under the Lee doctrine, depletion can get to the point where he has a preference on a
hole in the ground." See also discussion in PATONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1040-41.
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